6月5日下午2:30，南开经济研究所双周学术讨论会将举行。

本期讲座题目为：People Intentionally Avoid End-Game Information to Facilitate Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma

欢迎老师、同学届时参加讲座。

主讲人

邹文博 副研究员

主讲人简介: 邹文博，南开大学经济学院副研究员。研究领域为行为与实验经济学、发展经济学。先后主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、南开大学亚洲研究中心资助研究项目等；目前已在Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、World Development 等国内外核心期刊发表多篇文章。

讲座摘要：All long-term relationships ultimately face the possibility of dissolution. When information about the game horizon can be avoided, individuals who understand the role of dynamic incentives in supporting cooperation may choose to forgo such information, aiming to prevent or mitigate the unraveling of cooperation predicted by backward induction. This paper examines endogenous horizon information choices in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games, both theoretically and experimentally. We identify subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in which either one or both players choose not to acquire horizon information. In both cases, cooperation can emerge if the continuation probability of the repeated game is sufficiently large. Under unilateral information avoidance, the informed player can exploit the information asymmetry to earn a higher payoff. In a laboratory experiment, we found that only a small percentage of participants chose to avoid horizon information. However, for one of the two horizon sequences that we used, the treatment in which horizon information was endogenously chosen at no cost yielded significantly higher levels of cooperation than the treatment with exogenously provided information. We also found modest evidence supporting the payoff advantage of the informed player in the unilateral information avoidance scenario. 

讲座时间：2025年6月5日 下午2:30

讲座地点：经济学院八楼大会议室

主办单位：南开经济研究所